Sleepwalking With the Bomb Read online

  SLEEPWALKING

  ITH THE BOMB

  Description

  Sleepwalking with the Bomb shows how we can forestall nuclear catastrophe. It offers familiar faces, cases and places to illustrate how the civilized world can face the most pressing nuclear dangers. Drawing from both history and current events, John Wohlstetter assembles in one place an integrated, coherent and concise picture that explains how best to avoid the “apocalyptic trinity”—suicide, genocide and surrender—in confronting emerging nuclear threats.

  Copyright Notice

  Copyright © 2012 by John C. Wohlstetter. All Rights Reserved.

  Library Cataloging Data

  Sleepwalking with the Bomb by John C. Wohlstetter

  266 pages, 6 x 9 x 0.6 inches & 0.87 lb, 229 x 152 x 15 mm. & 0.396 kg

  Library of Congress Control Number: 2012940396

  ISBN-13 978-1-936599066 (paperback)

  BISAC: HIS027030 History/Military/Nuclear Warfare

  BISAC: POL001000 Political Science/International Relations/Arms Control

  BISAC: HIS032000 History/Europe/Russia & the Former Soviet Union

  Publisher Information

  Discovery Institute Press, 208 Columbia Street, Seattle, WA 98104

  Internet: http://www.discoveryinstitutepress.com/

  Published in the United States of America on acid-free paper.

  First Edition, First Printing. June 2012.

  Praise for Sleepwalking with the Bomb

  JOHN WOHLSTETTER HAS GIVEN US A TOUR DE FORCE OF OUR TROUBLED nuclear condition, its roots and its prospects. It’s all here: an insightful history of the nuclear aspect of the Cold War and its crises, fictional as well as real; the chilling prospects of nuclear-armed rogue states and terrorists; the dangerous links between civilian nuclear power for the grid and nuclear weapons; the fuzzy and counterproductive dreams of the zero nukes movement.

  For many years Sleepwalking With the Bomb will be the standard against which all other work on nuclear issues will be measured.

  R. JAMES WOOLSEY, FORMER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, CHAIRS THE FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES.

  In these perilous times of nuclear Jihad and amputational pacifism we acutely need John Wohlstetter’s Reverean ride through the night, ringing out strategic alarms and insights in the grand tradition of Herman Kahn and Albert Wohlstetter. Sleepwalking With the Bomb is as lucid, sophisticated, and wide awake as America’s current leadership is muddled, naive, and somnambulant.

  GEORGE GILDER, AUTHOR OF THE ISRAEL TEST (ENCOUNTER BOOKS, 2012) AND WEALTH & POVERTY (REGNERY, 2012).

  To family, friends, and others who educated me in coping with life’s challenges, including the challenge of thinking about how best to avoid man-made catastrophes—of which nuclear conflict is most fearsome and destructive of all.

  Contents

  FOREWORD

  PREFACE

  INTRODUCTION: ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK

  1. THE RUSH TO NUCLEAR ZERO: COURTING CATASTROPHE

  2. THE NUCLEAR AGE: FROM “TRINITY” TO TEHRAN

  3. RUSSIA: LINKING ARMS CONTROL TO AN ADVERSARY’S CONDUCT

  4. AMERICA: THE LIMITS OF WHAT ARMS PACTS CAN ACCOMPLISH

  5. IRAN AND THE MIDEAST: SLIDING TOWARDS NUCLEAR WAR

  6. NORTH KOREA: NUCLEAR HOSTAGE TAKING

  7. CHINA: IMPERIAL ASPIRATION AMIDST A SHIFTING NUCLEAR BALANCE

  8. PAKISTAN AND INDIA: WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?

  9. IRAQ: THE INFORMATION LIMITS OF INTELLIGENCE

  10: ALLIES: WHY FRIENDS PROLIFERATE

  11. DISARMAMENT I: SUPERPOWER ARMAMENT, POPULAR DISARMAMENT

  12. DISARMAMENT II: SOME DISARM, OTHERS MUST BE DISARMED

  13. INVITATION TO STRIKE: THE SMALL POWER’S NUCLEAR EQUALIZER

  14. THE PERILOUS PRESENT: BEYOND MYTHIC PASTS AND FANTASY FUTURES

  APPENDIX 1: FICTION’S WAR AGAINST NUCLEAR REALITIES

  APPENDIX 2: IMPROVING CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS

  APPENDIX 3: INTELLIGENCE BIASES AND THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

  APPENDIX 4: MISSILE DEFENSE VERSUS MULTIPLE WARHEADS

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  FOREWORD

  Richard Perle

  WHEN RICHARD NIXON RETURNED FROM MOSCOW IN 1972 HE brought with him the apparent triumph of a comprehensive agreement with Leonid Brezhnev that would end a nuclear weapons “arms race” and usher in a new era of constructive cooperation between the superpowers. Neither he, nor his grand strategist Henry Kissinger, understood that the ABM Treaty and separate offensive arms limitation agreements they negotiated would lead to a massive Soviet build-up that left the United States (and its allies) in a situation far worse than the one they hoped to improve.

  Far from reducing the Soviets’ already vast nuclear arsenal, the agreements of 1972 actually increased both the number and lethality of Moscow’s nuclear forces. And they led directly to a challenge to the United States and its allies that was as grave as any in the Cold War.

  The 1972 interim agreement fixed the number of launchers for nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, but it allowed for the enlargement of those launchers and the replacement of older, single warhead missiles by new missiles with multiple warheads. The Soviets promptly began to exploit both provisions of the agreement, first by replacing a class of missiles carrying a single warhead with a new class carrying three warheads. But not content with using an arms control “freeze” to triple the number of their warheads, they then proceeded to develop an entirely new missile, which was excluded from any limit because it lacked intercontinental range. The Soviets assigned this new missile (known as the SS-20) to the European targets that had been previously assigned missiles limited by the agreement. This freed up hundreds of missiles that could now be aimed at the United States. By the time Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the SS-20 and NATO’s plan to respond had created a crisis in the NATO alliance, as our allies debated whether to approve a plan to balance the new SS-20s with American missiles of comparable range. For much of Reagan’s first term the crisis dominated America’s relations with Russia and its NATO allies.

  The unintended consequences of the 1972 arms agreement is but one example of a lesson that the Obama administration has yet to learn: arms control is seldom a solution but is often a problem. Today, the ill-founded belief that arms control treaties with Russia are vital to American interests militates against sensible policies regarding missile defense and nuclear weapons proliferation. By their nature, international treaties treat all signatories alike. Yet the great challenge of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons will not be met until we accept that not all states or regimes are the same: nuclear weapons in the hands of Britain or France or the United States are not the same as nuclear weapons belonging to North Korea or Iran.

  It was a misplaced global/legal sentiment that helped get us into today’s situation where nuclear technology has been freely distributed around the world, waiting only for “peaceful” nuclear programs to be transformed into programs for nuclear weapons. The chances are that a future nuclear conflict will involve weapons acquired by one or more states that benefited from outside technical assistance based on, and justified by, the Atoms for Peace program and its progeny, the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

  John Wohlstetter knows all this and a great deal more. With great clarity and effortless instruction he has astutely analyzed and explained the history and current issues surrounding nuclear weapons. Anyone wishing to understand the past, present and future of nuclear weapons should read this fine book before saying or writing a word on the subject. I can’t think of a single journalist or government official, especially those with strong opinions on nuclear matters, wh
o would not benefit from reading Sleepwalking With The Bomb. (The more they think they know, the greater the benefit.) But the thing most devoutly to be wished is that someone, somewhere in the Obama administration (and those that follow it) will read this important book.

  —RICHARD PERLE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

  PREFACE

  THE IDEA FOR THIS BOOK CAME FROM WATCHING ADMINISTRATIONS make avoidable mistakes during the period after the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the former Soviet Union. There were things done right as well, but nuclear policy is supremely unforgiving, leaving little margin for error and little time to correct mistakes. Applying lessons from the failure to stop North Korea’s nuclear quest, for example, would have led to better decisions and perhaps avoided the peril we confront today with Iran. This book draws lessons that I hope will give future leaders of the civilized world a better chance to make sound decisions.

  A book of this nature necessarily involves some technical explanations and use of terms not universally familiar. I have done my best to make this material as clear as possible for nonspecialists; some clarifications and definitions are offered in the text itself, and some are in footnotes or in the book’s appendices.

  The period covered in this book encompasses the last 46 years of the former Soviet Union (also known by the Anglicized initials USSR, or as Soviet Russia), and the first 20 years of its current remnant, Russia (known as the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic, or RFSFR, when part of the USSR). “Soviet Union” and “Russia” were used colloquially during the Cold War period as interchangeable, and in the text the names are often alternated or combined, depending on context. The text also follows colloquial usage in referring to the United Kingdom as Britain or Great Britain or England.

  Foreign names are spelled per usage familiar to the public; if I cite a text, I generally follow the spelling in the version cited. For Chinese names, I follow the modern, phonetic Pinyin system (thus “Jiang Zemin”); but I use the older Wade-Giles Roman transliteration for Taiwanese names (thus “Chiang Kai-Shek”).

  I mined sources primarily for factual support for matters in the text, with analysis mine unless otherwise attributed. Where named people who have written memoirs are cited, their memoirs, if listed in the bibliography, are used as primary source material for what they said, wrote, or thought. Special attribution in the text is given to certain works unusual for their coverage of one or more parts of the puzzle, or for offering an especially valuable narrative. The text includes a bibliography of some of the more important works in the field, all of which were consulted in writing this book. Complete documentation of quotations and factual data is available online at www.SleepwalkingBomb.com.

  As with any book, the author owes much to many. Bruce Chapman, founder and guide of Discovery Institute, created a home for me to think and write—at his insistence, in that order. His counsel on how best to proceed was invaluable, as was his editorial advice. Discovery’s Steve Burie provided me with serial events at which to float my analyses and conclusions before a public audience.

  George Gilder contributed the insights of his capacious, creative intellect, plus much encouragement and sage advice for the entire project. Others who read drafts and offered guidance and encouragement include Rosann Kaplin, Nicholas Fuhrman, Jack Oslund, and Tim Wilson. Tim brought his expert knowledge of weaponry to clear up key points. Edward Weidenfeld offered the sage advice drawn from his lifetime immersion in national security policy, politics, and history.

  Special mention must be made of the late David Ginsburg, whose storied Washington career spanned 72 years, and who crossed paths with countless major national security figures around the world and in 13 American administrations. Thirty-one years of periodic lunches and serious conversation on issues of the day were an education for me and inspired me to try writing books.

  Special thanks also to Richard Perle, who contributed the foreword. Meeting Herb London proved a landmark in my life. He invited me to become a trustee of the Hudson Institute, and has been a constant source of encouragement. Fellow trustees Linden Blue, Jack David, and Scooter Libby, Hudson CEO and president, and Ken Weinstein, and Hudson scholars Douglas Feith, and Christopher Ford provided essential perspectives on nuclear issues, in various contexts. Linden brought in Robert Schleicher, who offered expert advice on nuclear technology basics. Michael Ledeen offered abundant historical perspective. Peter Huessy and Sven Kramer shared their wide knowledge of arms-control and strategic weapons issues. Claudia Rosett and Gordon Chang offered deeply informed perspective on North Korea and China. Laurie Mylroie, as always, educated me on Mideast matters.

  If it flies, Stu Johnson and Paul Hart know all about it. Ike Nehama aided my look at missile defense. Alan Salisbury and Marc Gunnels gave me needed military perspective on key issues. Michael Brewer applied his insightful analysis to a wide range of subjects. George Brokaw pointed me to a source I had overlooked. Jeff Gibbs lent his historical scholarship and long experience to various topics; he also pointed me to Thomas Hone, whose essay on the Washington Naval Treaty was very illuminating. Yuri Mamchur tested my Russia arguments, to my benefit. Henry Sokolski’s Nonproliferation Policy Center provided a gold mine of proliferation data and analysis, plus public forums with discussion of the highest quality. Bob Zarate collaborated with Henry on editing the writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, an invaluable source. Joan Hall, my first cousin, added her insights on Albert, Roberta and issues of the day.

  A September 2011 visit to Israel, under the auspices of the Hudson Institute and hosted by the Friends of the Israeli Defense Forces, provided a close-up look at the strategic situation of one of America’s firmest, most trustworthy allies, a world leader in critical military and commercial technologies.

  Online publishers The American Spectator, Human Events, and Daily Caller published my national security articles, enabling me to air some of my arguments during the book’s long gestation. Hudson DC’s Grace Terzian shepherded my twin publications on Herman Kahn for Hudson Institute. Hudson NY’s former online editor, Nina Rosenwald, published my comparison between the Washington naval treaties and the SALT treaties.

  I give heartfelt thanks to the talk radio hosts who provided me with hundreds of radio opportunities on stations of local, citywide, statewide, and national reach. They gave me a platform to present my national security thoughts to a broad swath of Americans—including those who called in to engage me directly.

  I owe a special debt to two permanent members of the strategic community, my late uncle and aunt, Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter. Their work, which spanned the half century following World War II, has been an inspiration to me.

  Albert Wohlstetter focused on issues of strategy, force structure, and nuclear proliferation and associated incentives, aiming to avoid nuclear conflict without the free world surrendering. Roberta Wohlstetter addressed nuclear proliferation as well. But she is best known for her seminal work on intelligence and strategic surprise. In Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (1962) Roberta examined the intelligence failure that led to Japan’s successful destruction of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. Her work showed that evidence of an attack was never clear enough, nor highlighted sufficiently, to enable decision makers to anticipate what transpired. The perceived improbability of Japan striking such an audacious blow, impermeable bureaucratic walls between agencies, organizational sloth, and the ardent—understandable—human desire to decline to believe the worst among possibilities, combined to lead to disaster. Roberta won the Bancroft Prize in history for her book. To this day, many in the intelligence community refer to the problem of anticipating strategic surprise as a “Roberta problem.” The 9/11 Commission Report dealt with similar issues after what we consider the twenty-first century’s first Pearl Harbor. New disclosures upon the seventieth anniversary of the attack confirm the acuity of the analysis Roberta presented 50 years ago. It was the work of Albert and Roberta that got my attention in junior high school days, and made my study of the
se issues a lifetime quest.

  I finally thank two editors who worked on the book. Louisa Gilder edited early versions of the manuscript, and brought to bear both her knowledge as the accomplished author of a history of physics and the perspective of a younger generation—both with highly positive results. Anne Himmelfarb applied her elegant editing skills to later drafts. She also copy-edited the final manuscript, a service she ably performed for my first book.

  I am, needless to say, solely responsible for all errors of analysis, context, and fact, and any other faults in my book.

  INTRODUCTION: ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK

  THE AIM OF THIS BOOK IS TO EQUIP READERS WITH A BROAD UNDERSTANDING of fundamental nuclear weapons issues and to draw lessons from history that can help us avoid nuclear catastrophe. Two generations ago “the Bomb” was uppermost in the national consciousness. For those of us who grew up in the “duck and cover” 1950s, the national shock of Sputnik’s October 1957 launch is an indelible memory. The race for the moon had suspenseful moments worthy of Hollywood. As for Tinseltown, it plied us with radioactive monster movies in the 1950s, Cold War dramas or satire in the 1960s, and peace pictures in the 1970s.

  The real-life parade of nuclear crises peaked with the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which put the entire country on edge for a fearful fortnight. Assassinations, riots, and wars followed. But through it all the concrete prospect of nuclear holocaust cast a baleful shadow over the body politic.

  Then came the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and two years later the end of the Soviet Union’s “evil empire,” as Ronald Reagan famously tagged it. With the “peace dividend” of the 1990s and a “Goldilocks Economy” Americans enjoyed a storied “holiday from history.” Democracy and free markets were increasingly ascendant in many parts of the globe, astonishing to those who remembered how rare they once were.